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BETRAYING FORMALITY FOR FALSE EQUITY:
THE DANGER OF TRANSPOSING EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATIONS INTO CONTRACT LAW TO
REMEDY REGULATORY PITFALLS
ELLIOTT MORRIS*
INTRODUCTION
The core function of a contract is to ensure contracting parties
that they will get what they bargain for. To facilitate this function contracts
must inherently serve to bind parties to the terms of their agreement.
Remove this axiomatic quality, and contracts essentially become a jumble
of words worth less than the paper they are printed on. A cursory survey
of contract law displays a common theme of courts vehemently protecting
this principle—utterly refusing to determine the scope of an agreement,
regardless of whether unforeseen circumstances transformed an equita-
ble transaction into an unconscionable but binding agreement.1 Tradi-
tional contractual remedies echo the notion that a court’s inquiry rests
exclusively upon formal concerns (such as whether the parties’ bargain
established a legally recognizable right).2 While traditional contract
analysis may have carried harsh results, courts remained stalwart to the
principle of non-invasive analysis.3
The historical reluctance of courts to redefine or modify an agree-
ment followed the ideal that the burden of contracting should be borne
by those seeking to contract.4 The general justification for the court’s
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School; B.A. Philosophy, Emory University, 2014,
magna cum laude. The author wishes to thank James and Delilah Morris for inspiring
his decision to pursue a legal career, and additionally wishes to thank Professors Nathan
B. Oman and Thomas J. McSweeney for enriching his legal education.
1 See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522–23 (Va. 1954) (holding that because Zehmer
was competent to contract, the sale of property was valid insofar as it met the formal
requirements for contracting); N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d
265, 266 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to modify the terms of the agreement despite the con-
tract’s clear result of bankrupting one of the parties).
2 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing
a non-exhaustive list of available contract remedies).
3 Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 674 (1902).
4 See id.
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reluctance to intervene and fix broken contracts was rooted in a respect
for the autonomy of the contracting parties—an understanding that the
parties themselves are more competent to evaluate and assign risk insofar
as the parties have the most at stake in the transaction.5 Abstractly then,
the loss of equity arising from poor contracting may be seen as both an
incentive for parties to carefully construct their agreements and a necessary
cost for facilitating an efficient and uniform transactional playing field.
Contemporary legal scholars often refer to this approach of judi-
cial restraint when analyzing contracts as “Legal Formalism” or the
“Formalist” approach because the approach generally places significance
in an agreement’s form.6 Within the realm of pure contract interpreta-
tion, Legal Formalism has remained the prevalent approach.7 However,
particular frictions in modern transactions have led some courts to stray
from the traditional Formalist approach, and in response to perceived
inequity, transpose equitable considerations into the analysis of particu-
lar contracts.8 The approach has been coined “Legal Functionalism” or
the “Functionalist” approach.9 Under a Functionalist approach, concerns
regarding a uniform and consistently applied legal framework for trans-
actions are superseded by a desire to interpret contracts in a way that
yields socially desirable consequences.10 Legal Functionalism has the
most traction within the context of insurance contracts—especially when
the insured party is a consumer.11 Within the context of insurance con-
tracts, the Functionalist approach practically functions to aggressively
interpret insurance agreements in favor of the insured.12 Generally, courts
5 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 369–77, 389 (1898); see generally N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co.,
799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
6 Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a
Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 543, 545–46 (1996).
7 Layer v. Barrow County, 778 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 2015) (denying relief on the basis of an
oral “contract” because plaintiff Mike Layer failed to meet any of the formal requirements
of the accusations he alleged).
8 C & J Fert., Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 169 (Iowa 1975) (concluding that
the dickered exclusion of “burglary” which excluded “inside jobs” was “unconscionable”
to the “doctrine of reasonable expectations”).
9 Swisher, supra note 6, at 544–45, 551.
10 Id. at 546.
11 James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?:
Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 995 (1992) (discussing the various techniques
and doctrines implemented by courts in evaluating the duties and scope of coverage of
insurance contracts).
12 Id. at 998 (“Pro insured bias would appear to be a systemic bias; yet, the bias is episodic
in implementation.”).
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justify the aggressive pro-insured bias upon the insurer’s superior sophisti-
cation and bargaining power.13
The fundamental issue with the Functionalist approach is incon-
sistency. Considering the equitable consequences of transactions inherently
requires a costly weighing of the specific factual scenario surrounding the
transaction, such an application of transaction-specific considerations
only inspires uncertainty, and uncertainty inspires greater transaction
costs.14 Changes in facts and moral sentiments obscure the consequences
of actions and undermine the most fundamental pursuit of contract
law—to give the parties what they bargained for. The difficulty in weighing
equitable concerns is perhaps the reason why courts applying the Func-
tionalist approach often presume inequity when one party is perceived
to stand in a superior position.15
While the Formalist approach may yield some harsh consequences,
at the very least the approach facilitates commercial uniformity and ef-
ficiency, and also disperses the costs and burdens of contracting equitably
upon those benefiting from the contract.16 When parties are commercially
sophisticated, a reasonable Formalist approach appears unquestionably
superior insofar as an efficient and consistent market is arguably a nec-
essary condition for facilitating the fairest groundwork for commercial
transactions.17
Even if one grants the underlying assumption that the moral
concern for fair contracting outweighs concerns of market efficiency, the
Functionalist approach at best provides the incentive for lazy contracting
and at worst it provides an incentive for immoral transacting.18 Instead
of encouraging greater sophistication, the approach would exchange
contractual autonomy for inconsistent protections. The principle of con-
tractual autonomy should be axiomatic to the body of contract law. While
13 See id. at 110, 1013 (discussing various justifications for special insurance contract
interpretation rules, ultimately concluding that the true justification stems from an in-
formational asymmetry between the insurer and the insured). But see Swisher, supra
note 6, at 545, 551, 588. See generally C & J Fert., Inc., 227 N.W.2d. at 169–71.
14 Swisher, supra note 6, at 996–97, 1047, 1058.
15 Fischer, supra note 11, at 1012 (“Nonetheless, courts often avoid analysis of these ques-
tions and simply declare that the contract is one of adhesion.”).
16 See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law,
97 YALE L.J. 949, 950–52, 1012–1016 (1988).
17 See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
18 Id. at 1688.
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not an exclusively American principle, the “right” to contract serves as a
historical cornerstone of American business transactions.19
Even if the policy justifications of discrepancies in sophistication
and bargaining power are assumed to be valid, the application of legal
formalism to insurance contracts appears somewhat inappropriate in
light of the legislative and commercial realities of the insurance industry.
The insurance industry is among one of the most heavily regulated indus-
tries in America.20 One of the reasons that states regulate the insurance
industry so heavily is precisely because of the concern that insurers will
take advantage of their less-sophisticated consumer base.21 In exchange
for extensive state regulation, insurers are allowed to benefit from relaxed
antitrust scrutiny, which enables insurers to pool and compile data regard-
ing court treatment of particular provisions.22 In turn, this information
is used to provide “standardized terms” that courts would theoretically
recognize and interpret in a consistent and predictable fashion.23 Despite
standardization, courts still interpret insurance contracts with an aggres-
sive pro-insured bias.24 Courts aptly recognize that the standardization
of terms still does not remedy the sophistication discrepancy which exists
between insurers and insured.25 While some courts have entertained the
idea of imposing a duty to inform upon insurers, courts generally refrain
from doing so.26 As a result courts still approach insurance contracts
(especially average consumer contracts) with a decisively pro-insured
bias, which often gives effect to the insured’s expectations of coverage
regardless of whether such an expectation was reasonable.27
Nevertheless, developments in the law display a dangerous po-
tential for courts to transpose the equitable considerations derived from
19 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 66 (1905) (articulating a fundamental “right to con-
tract” derived from economic due process). But see W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 392 (1937) (denying the economic due process mechanism upon which the Lochner
decision relied). While the status of an American “right to contract” as a fundamental
right is questionable, the ability to freely contract arguably has remained at very least
an implicit right in traditional U.S. transactions; however, particular aspects of modern
transactions have led some to question the competency of party’s ability to contract.
20 Fischer, supra note 11, at 1002.
21 Id. at 1047–48.
22 Id. at 1054–56.
23 Id. at 996.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1047.
26 Fischer, supra note 11, at 999.
27 Id. at 997.
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the Functionalist approach to complex business transactions where the
justifications for the Functionalist’s relaxed-equitable standards are
utterly irrelevant, and serve no legitimate policy concern.28 The starkest
example of such an inappropriate invasion of equity lies in the small
“majority” of states’ allocation of Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) liability to insurers under
pre-CERCLA Comprehensive29 General Liability (“CGL”) insurance
policies.30 All three of the majority approaches attach liability to insur-
ance issuers in a manner that is absurd and runs entirely contrary to any
established body of contract law. While the scope of this issue is undoubt-
edly limited,31 the doctrinal conclusions drawn from numerous courts
indicate that future legislation mimicking the retroactive structure of
CERCLA could similarly inspire extreme judicial departures from con-
tract law. Modern regulation often imposes hardship upon industries.
When hardships arise as a consequence of legislation, such hardships
may present a dangerous temptation for courts to apply legal Functional-
ism to pre-regulatory agreements on the basis that the regulation itself
renders the circumstances inequitable.
Courts should avoid the temptation of turning contract law into
something beyond its intended purpose of facilitating commercial trans-
actions. In attempting to reach the fairest conclusion courts will only
betray efficiency for perceived equity.32
This Note will analyze the majority approaches to pre-CERCLA
CGL contracts from both Formalist and Functionalist approaches, with
the intent of displaying how counterintuitive the majority’s reasoning is
28 This Note is not primarily concerned with evaluating the Functionalist justification
regarding consumer protection. As such, this paper will not address this argument. However,
the author remains highly skeptical of the assumption that judicial activism is the most
beneficial way of effectuating consumer protection as opposed to regulatory supervision.
29 Comprehensive General Liability Insurance (CGL), INSURANCEOPEDIA.COM, https:/www
.insuranceopedia.com/definition/1292/comprehensive-general-liability-insurance-cgl
[https://perma.cc/GQK9-FTQ3] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) (explaining that modern versions
of CGL insurance are commonly referred to as “commercial general liability” as opposed
to “comprehensive general liability”).
30 McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 477 S.W.3d 786, 793, 803 (2015).
31 Swisher, supra note 6, at 600 (noting that modern CGL policies explicitly reject indemni-
fication of CERCLA liability and courts generally appear to respect such agreements).
32 Ridgeway M. Hall Jr. & Kirsten Nathanson, Lessons Learned From the Intersection of
CERCLA and Contract Law, 32 Envt’l L. Rev. 11481 (2002); see also DAVID B. FARER, CON-
TRACTUAL ALLOCATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN TRANSACTIONS: CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
UNDER CERCLA (2013), http://www.greenbaumlaw.com/media/publication/29_Contractual
%20Allocation%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PPY-QYEA].
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in relation to any established body of contract interpretation.33 This Note
will be divided into four sections. Section I will provide a brief overview of
CERCLA. Section II will discuss the various approaches courts employ
when analyzing liability under pre-CERCLA CGL policies. Section III will
analyze these approaches under both Formalist and Functionalist per-
spectives and will argue that the shifting of liability to insurers under
pre-CERCLA CGL polices is unjustified. Finally, the Conclusion will sum-
marize the argument and provide concluding thoughts.
Prior to jumping the gun and delving into the issue, an understand-
ing of the radical effects of CERCLA is necessary in order to understand
the impetus behind the majority’s allegedly Functionalist reasoning.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
Beginning in the 1970s, amidst heightened environmental con-
cerns regarding the disposal of hazardous chemical waste, Congress began
arming the recently created Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
with a radical ability to allocate liability for environmental damage to
polluters through administrative proceedings.34 The new liability-allocat-
ing function of administrative proceedings vastly increased the efficiency
with which the EPA could enforce environmental regulations by provid-
ing an independent avenue for seeking environmental damages outside of
the typical jurisprudence, which hinged relief upon the cumbersome tort
action of nuisance law.35 As such, the EPA could enforce environmental
33 Like many insurance policies, Commercial General Liability insurance policies are
generally modeled on the standard ISO coverage form. See ISO, COMMERCIAL GENERAL
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM (2003), http://www.ngwa.org/documents/insurance/ngwasample
generalliabilityform.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4DE-25PN]. While contracting parties are free
to dicker the format, they rarely do so. See Marianne Bonner, Insurance Services Office
(ISO), THE BALANCE (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/insurance-services-office
-iso-462706 [https://perma.cc/E25Q-YB8H]. The provisions discussed in this Note are
rarely substantially altered. ISO regularly updates the provisions of the coverage form.
See Insurance Policy Programs, VERISK, https://www.verisk.com/capabilities/insurance-policy
-programs.html [https://perma.cc/9XRK-G372] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
34 See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 92 P.L. 500,
86 Stat. 816 (amendments to the water legislation are the first in a series of future
amendments and legislation that would empower the EPA to more robustly enforce
environmental laws); see also Frank P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law Ch. 4A, §
02 (Matthew Bender 2016) (1973) (providing background information on the impetus
behind CERCLA).
35 GRAD, supra note 34.
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regulations without getting bogged down in traditional court inquiries
involving rigid element requirements that required substantially more
legwork to satisfy.
In 1980, Congress passed the original version of CERCLA.36
CERCLA’s overarching goal was to institute a “polluter pay” system that
held polluters liable for their release of “hazardous substances.”37 CERCLA
accomplished this by instituting a very broad and inclusive liability
structure. In its original form, CERCLA enabled the EPA to attach lia-
bility to four types of parties: (1) the owner of the property, (2) any person
who owned a contaminated property at the time of disposal, (3) anyone
who owned the toxic substances that ultimately served as the source of
the contamination (regardless of whether they caused the pollution), and
(4) anyone who accepted the chemicals for transport.38 If liability at-
tached to any of these parties, the party would be liable for all costs
associated with the clean-up as well as any permanent damages for the
loss of natural resources.39
Within six years of CERCLA’s passage, Congress passed the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA” or “superfund”)
to correct issues that prevented full enforcement under CERCLA.40 The
superfund amendments reauthorized CERCLA and also yielded several
substantive changes, the most principle of which were broadening liabil-
ity and making polluter non-compliance a more costly endeavor.41 The
broadened scope of liability under SARA was justified on the basis that
discerning liability would be incredibly difficult where decades of envi-
ronmental pollution had effectively obscured or concealed the identity of
responsible parties.42 SARA further enables the EPA to disperse strict
liability joint and severally (with clean-up costs theoretically being dis-
tributed pro rata for each party’s share of the pollution).43 Undoubtedly,
36 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9605 (2012).
37 GRAD, supra note 34; see CERCLA § 101(14) (defining “hazardous substances”, mostly
in reference to other acts. Notably, petroleum is excluded from CERCLA’s definition of
“hazardous substances.”).
38 CERCLA § 107(a)(1)–(4).
39 Id. at § 107(a)(A)–(C) (outlining damages).
40 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986); GRAD, supra note 34, at Ch. 4A § 02(1)(a).
41 SARA, 100 Stat. 1613 sec. 205.
42 GRAD, supra note 34, at Ch. 4A § 02(1)(f).
43 Id. at § 02(1)(k)–(q).
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CERCLA lives up to its title of “comprehensive,” the CERCLA/SARA
structure for dispersing liability has generally been hailed as a massive
success—vastly increasing the efficiency of environmental restoration by
giving the EPA the proper authority to enforce environmental regulation;
however, this efficiency undoubtedly comes at a cost.44
CERCLA/SARA undeniably represents a paradigm shift in Ameri-
can environmental regulation—reflecting a stronger commitment to pro-
tecting the environment.45 However, as is often the byproduct of any
substantial paradigm shift, CERCLA’s abrupt transition to a radical and
robust liability structure yielded unforeseen and dramatic consequences
upon pre-CERCLA transactions.46 As CERCLA liability may attach
rapidly to a large pool of potentially responsible parties (“PRP[s]”), past
ownership/affiliation with a superfund property could inadvertently
subject a party to hundreds of thousands of dollars in clean-up costs.47
Liability may attach regardless of a party’s role (or lack of role) in rela-
tion to the pollution.48 Suddenly, owning a waste disposal company in the
1950s could result in hefty clean-up costs.49 The results of “CERCLA’s
joint and several liability scheme may be terribly unfair in certain in-
stances. Nonetheless, equitable considerations play no role in the appor-
tionment analysis . . . .”50
The irrelevance of equitable considerations is particularly reveal-
ing of CERCLA’s primary concern—principally finding a party to absorb
the costs of clean-up.51 This aim is furthered by the broad discretion with
which the EPA may institute an action. The timing of superfund actions
is left utterly to the determination of the EPA—meaning that one is
44 Id. at Ch. 4A § 01[5].
45 Id.
46 See generally Jeffrey M. Moss, Impact of CERCLA on Real Estate Transactions, 6 B.Y.U.
J. PUB. LAW 365 (1992).
47 See, e.g., Arizona v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2014) (Callahan, J. dissenting);
PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 514 (2013); U.S. v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2012).
48 Id.
49 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D. Conn. 1991), aff’d, 958 F.2d
1192 (2d Cir. 1992).
50 PCS Nitrogen Inc., 714 F.3d at 181(quoting Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d at 897 and
Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 615).
51 See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and Federal Facilities, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/comprehensive
-environmental-response-compensation-and-liability-act-cercla-and-federal [https://perma
.cc/8UYN-VMF7] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
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never certain when the EPA will actually take action, or whether they
will be held liable at all. For example, in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
over 200 users of a dump facility were held to be jointly and severally
liable for clean-up costs under CERCLA.52 Some of the parties found
liable were responsible for dumping that had occurred several years
prior.53 While CERCLA serves to efficiently facilitate environmental res-
toration, CERCLA’s application imparts increased transaction costs,
uncertainty, and unforeseen costs upon the American real estate and
commercial markets.54 While contemporary companies are given the
benefit of foresight, insofar as they are alerted to the consequences of
polluting or owning a superfund site post-CERCLA, the distribution of
liability to pre-CERCLA transactions represents a clear desire to obtain
liability independent of equitable considerations.55 Obviously, these affects
must be contextualized against the environmental successes of CERCLA;
however, those with a sympathetic heart may find that the application
of CERCLA liability to pre-CERCLA transactions inspires a certain
sympathy for those transactions, which retroactively gave rise to expen-
sive clean-up liability.
II. JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES
At the time of this Note, seventeen states have considered whether
a CGL insurer’s duty to defend is triggered by an EPA “Notice of Liability”
letter (“PRP Letter”),56 and fourteen of these states have effectively ruled
that the insurer is liable.57 In considering the allocation of CERCLA
52 See B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1192; see also U.S. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 164
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding the site-owner and the polluter jointly and severally liable for
clean-up costs).
53 B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1202.
54 Arguably, costs associated with waste disposal should be borne by those who engage
in the handling/production of hazardous materials. This Note will not investigate the
policy considerations behind CERCLA; rather, it will assume that the reforms were
merited by the need for hazardous material regulation.
55 PCS Nitrogen Inc., 714 F.3d at 181 (quoting Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d at 897).
56 A “Notice of Liability” letter is a letter sent to a party who is potentially liable for en-
vironmental damage under CERCLA. Superfund “Notice of Liability” Letters, EPA, http://
www.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund-notice-liability-letters [https://perma.cc/8GGE-VYSC]
(last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
57 The most recent case, McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 477 S.W.3d
786 (2015), brought the number of “hybrid” and “Functional equivalent” jurisdictions to
fourteen. These jurisdictions include: (1) Alabama; (2) Colorado; (3) Connecticut; (4) Iowa;
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liability under pre-CERCLA CGL contracts, courts primarily inquire into
whether the insurer’s duty to defend has been triggered.58 The inquiry
generally involves considering whether the EPA proceeding process (often
the specific PRP Letter itself) constitutes a “suit,” or at the very least the
“initiation of a suit.”59 In order to engage in this inquiry the court must
first find that the CGL provisional usage of “suit” is ambiguous.60
A. Minority “Literal” Approach
The three-state minority ends their analysis here—refusing to
construe the pre-CERCLA CGL policy’s usage of the word “suit” as am-
biguous.61 The literal approach rejects the notion that the word “suit” is
ambiguous in pre-CERCLA CGL policies, and instead considers the agree-
ments in light of the “literal” definition of suit.62 As such, courts employ-
ing the literal approach refuse to extend coverage to clean-up damages
arising from the EPA’s administrative actions on the grounds that the
actions do not fall under the pre-CERCLA connotation of “suits” (an actual
court proceeding initiated by the filing of a complaint).63 The practical
effect of this approach is that the insured is left with the burden of
paying the costs associated with releases of hazardous materials under
CERCLA.64 Some courts have distinguished “claim” and “suit,” and held
that the duty to defend is not triggered by a “claim” (as distinguished in
the policy from “suit”).65 Further, some courts impose a sort of quasi-duty
upon the insurer to investigate the viability of an administrative action
triggering their duty to defend under an individual policy.66
(5) Kentucky; (6) Massachusetts; (7) Michigan; (8) Minnesota; (9) Nebraska; (10) New
Hampshire; (11) North Carolina; (12) Texas; (13) Vermont; (14) Wisconsin. Conversely,
the number of states that have adopted what is considered a “literal” approach remains
three: (1) California; (2) Illinois; (3) Maine.
58 GRAD, supra note 34, Ch. 4A § 02 fn. 319; McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp., 477 S.W.3d
at 792. Note that a substantial number of Courts have also entertained whether clean-up
costs constitute “damages.”
59 GRAD, supra note 34, Ch. 4A § 02 fn. 51.
60 Id. at Ch. 4A § 02(1)(k),
61 This threshold claim that “suit” is ambiguous is suspect, and will be discussed in
further detail infra Section III.
62 See McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp., 477 S.W.3d at 800 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 802–03.
64 Id.
65 Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 107, 115–16 (Cal. 1998).
66 Id. at 115; see also Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d
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B. Majority “Hybrid,” “Functional Equivalent,” and “Effectively
Redefined” 67 Approaches
The ultimate result of all of these majority approaches is liability
attaching to the insurer as a result of an EPA proceeding constituting a
suit.68 All three majority approaches seem to be an attempt to make up
for the lack of equitable considerations in CERCLA rather than a genu-
ine assignment of liability under the CGL insurance policy. As mentioned
previously, these approaches all rely on a threshold finding that the word
“suit” is ambiguous.69 Some courts have gone so far as to base a finding
of ambiguity not upon the actual parties’ understandings of the term but
upon “the fact that another reasonable interpretation of the term ‘suit’
exists simply creates an ambiguity.”70
1. Majority: Functional Equivalent71 and Hybrid Approaches
Under the Functional equivalent approach, courts treat “any
receipt of a PRP Letter or other pre-complaint environmental agency
activity constitutes a “suit.”72 The Hybrid approach provides slightly
more consideration. Under the Hybrid approach a PRP Letter (or similar
item) must be significantly coercive to go beyond a “mere notification” to
constitute a “suit.”73 The difference in the approaches is essentially a
nominal matter of timing; to qualify as coercive the insured merely needs
to be noncompliant until the EPA attempts to force compliance at which
point the PRP Letter will be sufficiently coercive.74
842, 847 (Ill. 1995) (discussing the need for insurers to investigate whether “suit” is trig-
gered under their specific policy).
67 As of the time of this Note, the approach employed by the majority in McGinnes Indus.
Maint. Corp., 477 S.W.3d at 786 has not received a common colloquial title such as “hybrid”
or “Functional equivalent” as such this Note will refer to the approach as the “effectively
redefined” approach.
68 McGinnes Indust. Maint. Corp., 477 S.W.3d at 794 (maintaining that there is a need
for uniformity when considering the issue on certified question from the 5th Circuit).
69 Foster-Gardner, Inc., 959 P.2d at 118 (quoting Morrisville Water & Light Dep’t v. U.S.
Fid. & Guaranty Co., 775 F. Supp. 718, 734 (D. Vt. 1991)).
70 Id.
71 The approach is also sometimes referred to as the “Functional Approach.”
72 Foster-Gardner, Inc., 959 P.2d at 117.
73 Id.
74 The PRP process will be discussed in detail infra Section III.
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2. Texas “Effectively Redefined” Approach
In 2015, the 5th Circuit sent the issue of coverage to the Texas
Supreme Court.75 In McGinnes, the Court began by agreeing with the
minority of courts that “suit” as used in a standard-form CGL insurance
policy was unambiguous.76 However, the Court still concluded that “ ‘suit’
in CGL policies at issue must also include CERCLA enforcement pro-
ceedings by the EPA.”77 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court expressly
rejected the rationale that a “suit” is the “Functional Equivalent” either
by its inherent nature or depending upon its coerciveness.78
Despite acknowledging that Texas could not “ ‘rewrite the parties’
contract nor add to its language,” the Court felt content claiming that
CERCLA could—ultimately holding that the revolutionary nature of
CERCLA’s liability structure effectively redefined the word “suit.”79 The
Court claimed that CERCLA’s regulatory structure was effectively so
dynamic that it retroactively changed the nature of the word “suit.”80 As
such, Texas held that “EPA proceedings” are not just the “Functional
equivalent of a suit,” they are, “in actuality, the suit itself, only con-
ducted outside a courtroom.”81
In support of its finding, Texas provided three justifications:
“(1) CERCLA did not exist when the parties entered their contract;
(2) Environmental cleanup costs can qualify as “damages” under the
polices; (3) Most other courts have reached a similar conclusion.”82 At
5–4, the case was a close call, and the majority opinion was accompanied
by a scathing dissent.83
III. ANALYSIS
McGinnes not only represents the latest example of such a majority
ruling, but also represents arguably the most progressive and aggressive
75 McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp., 477 S.W.3d 786, 786 (2015).
76 Id. at 791 (“We agree with the Insurers that ‘suit’ commonly refers to a proceeding in
court.”).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 794.
80 McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp., 477 S.W.3d at 799 (Boyd, J. dissenting) (quoting Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 162 (Tex. 2003)).
81 Id. at 800.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 794.
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applications of Legal Functionalism.84 The Texas Supreme Court man-
aged to hold that a word whose meaning should have arguably been solidi-
fied by the intentions of the parties at the time the contract was written,
was retroactively changed by what ultimately amounts to an unforeseen
circumstance (i.e., CERCLA itself).85 Such a holding is not only utterly
repugnant to any prior body of established contract analysis, it serves no
greater policy consideration apart from the five-judge majority’s sense of
equity. In order to understand the absurdity of the Court’s decision, this
Note will analyze these majority positions from both a traditional Formalist
approach as well as a more progressive Functionalist approach.
A. Majority Approaches Analyzed Under Legal Formalism
1. Threshold: Finding “Suit” Vague
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority’s position has no basis in
traditional Formalist contract analysis; however, admittedly the act of
analyzing an insurance contract under traditional standards is some-
what misguided in modern jurisprudence. Of course some jurisdictions
maintain (or at least claim to maintain) a Formalist perspective on all
contracts.86 As has been mentioned previously, the majority’s position
requires a threshold finding of “suit” to be vague/ambiguous as contained
in the pre-CERCLA CGL policy.87 From the perspective of Formalist
analysis of vagueness/ambiguity the finding is unwarranted.
Historically, courts limited their interpretation to the traditional
“four-corners” of a contract.88 The “four-corners” rule means that a court
merely looks to enforcing the meaning of the contractual terms as the
parties’ mutual intent as expressed within the four-corners of the docu-
ment.89 Practically, the only manner a court could engage in an interpretive
analysis of the terms depended upon the possibility that parties may
have mutually intended a term to mean something other than its plain-
English meaning.90 If the parties agree to a mutual meaning, the court
84 Id.
85 Id. at 797.
86 See Swisher, supra note 6.
87 Morrisville Water & Light Dep’t v. U.S. Fid. & Guaranty Co., 775 F. Supp. 718, 734 (D.
Vt. 1991).
88 See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470, 472
(N.Y. 1923).
89 Id.
90 2–20 LN PRACTICE GUIDE: FL CONTRACT LITIGATION 20.05 (2015). It is worth noting
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simply accepts that meaning and applies it.91 Obviously, opposing parties
often disagree with the other side’s applied meaning, in such cases the
traditional default analysis was to proscribe the term its plain English
meaning.92 If the term were vague or ambiguous the court would engage
in an analysis to attempt to clear up the issue, if no solution could be
met, the court would hold that the agreement lacked mutual intent and
therefore never took effect.93
Absent a finding of ambiguity or vagueness, the application of the
four-corners doctrine to pre-CERCLA contracts would allocate the clean-
up costs to the insured insofar as a “suit” in the context of a pre-CERCLA
agreement likely carried the plain English connotation of a proceeding
filed in court.94
a. Vagueness/Ambiguity
Analyzing the CGL polices under either an ambiguity or vague-
ness analysis also does not justify the majority’s desired result. A court
inquiry into ambiguous/vague clauses/words does not involve stretching
the meaning of a word to benefit one party (in this case, the insured).
Traditionally, a court’s analysis of ambiguity centers upon whether the
parties intended the term to mean the same thing.95 In the event that
both parties construe the term in utterly different manners—then the
contract does not exhibit mutual assent and theoretically the document
is not a contract.96
Under this structure, the majority’s liability shifting result would
rely upon one party (the insurer) being aware of the insured’s contradic-
tory meaning.97 Within the context of a CGL insurance transaction this
result is virtually impossible. The insured would have to construe “suit”
to include an EPA administrative process that did not exist yet.98 Fur-
ther, the insurer would have to be aware of the insured’s impossible
that this perspective really applies more to U.C.C. contracts, wherein U.C.C. § 1-303(e)
(2014) provides a hierarchy of extrinsic evidence.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Fischer, supra note 11, at 1005. See generally Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng.
Rep. 373 (Ct. Ex.) (creating the classic resolution to ambiguity).
94 Fischer, supra note 11, at 1049.
95 See People v Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 977 N.Y.S.2d 668, 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 19–20 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
97 See id. at § 20(2)(a).
98 See McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp., 477 S.W.3d 786, 799 (2015) (Boyd, J., dissenting).
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construction of the term.99 To justify the inclusion of administrative
actions on the basis of ambiguity would essentially be accepting the lu-
dicrous conclusion that not only did the insured have the foresight to
hold an impossible intention to the definition and that the insurer was
aware of the insured’s impossible construction.100 Prior to CERCLA’s
passage, the definition of “suit” could not have included administrative
actions.101 Hybrid courts are essentially using the ambiguity analysis to
give “suit” a connotation that it never had, nor could have reasonably been
capable of having.
A similar result occurs if the majority is construing the term
“suit” as vague. In the event of a vague term, courts apply the “objective”
or “plain meaning” usage of the term in order to resolve an issue of
relativity.102 Issues of vagueness generally arise when a contract fails to
sufficiently specify the quality of the good.103 As such, the analysis is
seemingly inappropriate in the context of an insurance contract insofar
as the quality of the insurer’s duty is typically straightforward.104 Courts
employ a hierarchy of outside sources to clarify and interpret the vague-
ness.105 If the actual agreement is of no use, then doctrinally courts look
to the course of performance.106 If analyzed from this perspective of pre-
CERCLA insurance performance, insurers generally defended an insured
in traditional courts from damages arising from property. It seems il-
logical to suggest that the insurer’s course of performance could imply
coverage under non-existent administrative actions insofar as the in-
surer’s duty to defend had never been triggered in such instances prior.107
As such, there is no discernable traditional doctrinal basis for
reading in a court-created definition. The broader definition of “suit” is
essentially a court creation that, at best, relies upon broader modern
intuitions of what could possibly be considered a suit.108 Within the con-
text of a pre-CERCLA CGL contract, the court supplied definition ap-
pears absurdly broad.
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
100 Id.
101 The primary counterargument would be that the insured could have gauged the state
of legislative developments in environmental law, and anticipated the coming regulatory
scheme. Such a hypothetical relies on heavily attenuated and unlikely situation.
102 Hitt v. Lord, 391 S.E.2d 681, 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 20(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Foster-Gardner, Inc., 952 P.2d 107, 273–75 (Cal. 1998).
108 Id.
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b. Is an EPA Proceeding Functionally a Suit?
Ignoring the somewhat obvious conclusion that traditional con-
tractual analysis provides little assistance to effectuating the majority’s
desired result, the primary argument that serves as the bedrock for the
majority’s desire to attach liability to the insurer appears to be that an
EPA proceeding (regardless of whether or not it satisfies the traditional
definition) functions the same as a suit—and therefore should be treated
as a suit for purposes of analyzing liability under CERCLA.109 When
viewed from the perspective of a pre-CERCLA insured, the argument is
ultimately weak.
An understanding of the PRP process is necessary in order to ac-
cess the viability of this claim. Two aspects of EPA collection proceedings
run contrary to the functional equivalent argument that administrative
actions the are functionally equivalent to pre-CERCLA “suits”: (a) the
structure of the EPA’s collection is vastly different from a lawsuit; (b) a
pre-CERCLA party has virtually no viable defenses against the EPA, and
a party’s culpability for CERCLA damage need not have any causal re-
lation to the actual pollution.
1) Structure of an EPA Collection Action
As previously mentioned, the EPA has a large amount of discre-
tion in applying CERCLA. The timing of CERCLA-related controversies
is exclusively controlled by the EPA insofar as CERCLA’s relevant
statute of limitation provisions generally toll upon the beginning of
clean-up.110 The procedure for acquiring remedial costs for pollution is
also left to the EPA to decide.111 From the standpoint of administrative
efficiency the EPA’s discretion enables it to seek damages for environ-
mental pollution dynamically.
Depending on its preference, the EPA may pursue one of four
ways to collect clean-up costs.112 (1) Assuming the PRP is compliant, EPA
and PRP(s) may negotiate a settlement.113 (2) The EPA can clean-up the
site and then seek reimbursement from the PRP(s) in a subsequent
suit.114 (3) The EPA may file an abatement action in a federal district
109 Id.
110 CERCLA § 113(g)(3).
111 McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp., 477 S.W.3d 786, 800 (2015) (Boyd, J. dissenting).
112 Id. at 801.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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court to compel PRP(s) to conduct the clean-up.115 (4) Finally, the EPA
may issue a unilateral administrative order instructing PRP(s) to restore
the site.116
The actual number of steps required to collect under these four
methods varies considerably. After identifying a property that potentially
qualifies as a superfund site under CERCLA, the EPA will generally
issue a potentially responsible party (“PRP”) letter.117 This letter serves
to both notify the PRP of the EPA’s subsequent superfund investigation,
and to facilitate compliance with the investigation.118 Often, the PRP
letter will demand that the PRP pay costs associated with environmental
feasibility studies.119 The letters also will generally alert the PRP to
several disadvantages to non-compliance, such as treble damages.120 The
penalties for non-compliance play a substantial role in finding the letters
coercive under the hybrid approach. Typically, the letter will offer the
opportunity to enter into negotiations. If the PRP complies with the
letter’s demands and joins in negotiations, the EPA and the PRP will
come to a settlement, and costs will be allocated according to the terms
of that settlement.121
Viewed as such, none of the processes the EPA employs for seek-
ing liability functions like a suit in the traditional sense.122 For starters,
the administrative proceeding’s structure and timing are primarily de-
termined by the EPA, as the CERCLA’s statute of limitations provides
a virtually unrestricted amount of timing discretion to the EPA.123 The
first iteration of CERCLA (prior to SARA) lacked any statute of limitations
governing the time with which a recovery action could be commenced;
however, the SARA amendments provide the EPA with a somewhat
flexible statute of limitations period—whereby the statute of limitations
applies differently for remedial cost recovery actions and contribution
115 Id.
116 Id. (discussing the various ways the EPA can seek damages under CERCLA).
117 GRAD, supra note 34.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See CERCLA § 107(c)(3) (non-compliance penalties).
121 3–4A TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02 passim.
122 Id. It is worth noting that of these four options, only the last does not involve a court
proceeding in the event of a PRP’s non-compliance; however, the unilateral order does not
function like a typical court order insofar as the PRP may choose to “refuse to comply
with the order,” in which case the EPA must bring an action in federal court. See 3–4A
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02 passim.
123 CERCLA § 113(g)(2)(B).
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claims.124 Remedial cost recovery actions must commence within the
latter of: (A) six years from the “physical initiation” of a remedial action;
or (B) three years after the remedial action has been completed.125 Con-
tribution claims must be commenced within a tighter period of three
years from “(A) the date of judgement in any action under [the] chapter,
or (B) the date of an administrative order [‘de minimis’ settlements; cost
recovery settlements; judicial-approved settlements].”126
These statute of limitation periods provide the EPA with a generous
amount of time to seek damages insofar as both limitation periods effec-
tively toll upon a stage in which an administrative action has already
been initiated and is virtually guaranteed to proceed.127 Furthermore,
courts evaluating the applicability of CERCLA’s statute of limitations
generally construe the period “broadly” in favor of the EPA.128
2) Limited Defenses to CERCLA Liability and Lack of Causation
Requirement
Modern PRPs facing CERCLA liability are limited to a small list
of defenses provided within CERCLA’s regulation.129 Under §107(B) of
CERCLA, PRP defenses are limited to: (1) acts of god; (2) acts of war;
(3) third party negligence (“innocent landowner defense”130), when the PRP
proves he exercised due care with respect to foreseeable acts or omis-
sions.131 At first glance, the available defenses in CERCLA proceedings
will appear somewhat analogous to a standard force majeure provision
insofar as the CERCLA defenses generally rely upon an unquestionably
natural event or the negligence of an unrelated third party.132 However
124 See Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir 1993) (citing CERCLA
§ 113(g)(2)).
125 CERLCA § 113(g)(2)(B).
126 CERCLA § 113(g)(3). For information regarding statute of limitations requirements
for private invocation of CERCLA damages, see CERCLA § 112(d)(2)(A)–(B) (tolling on
the later of the date of discovery of the loss or the date on which final regulations are
promulgated under § 301(c)).
127 At both stages, the action is well developed—the ultimate conclusion is virtually only
a matter of proceeding down the procedural checklist.
128 Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1520 (1st Cir. 1991).
129 CERCLA § 107(a)–(c).
130 The CERCLA § 107(b)(3) defense was amended by SARA and is often referred to gen-
erally as the “innocent landowner defense.” See, e.g., City of Gary v. Shafer, 683 F. Supp.
2d 836, 854 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
131 CERCLA § 107(b)(1)–(3).
132 See generally 5–31 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 31.02 (Michael B. Gerrard
ed., Matthew Bender) (2015).
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practically speaking, the defenses are further limited by court-created
requirements and subsequent statutory adjustments.133
The “act of god defense” is only available where the event is solely
an “exceptional natural occurrence” and is neither foreseeable nor
preventable.134 This qualification is extremely limiting as it precludes
several applicable natural occurrences, most principle of which is ex-
treme or exceptional rainfall, which may often be the impetus behind the
displacement of hazardous chemicals from a commercial entity.135 As
such, actual case law concerning the “act of god” defense is somewhat
scant; however, heavy rain or hurricane downpours are generally held to
be inapplicable due to preventative measures that could be taken to limit
the effects.136
The act of war defense is similarly limited to acts “solely” arising
as a result of war.137 As one might expect this defense has rarely been
employed.138 Limited analysis has provided that the defense must be
employed against “direct acts of hostility or seizure or destruction of
property in order to injure the enemy.”139
The final defense may be asserted when a 3rd party is the sole
cost of the contamination.140 Court treatment of the popularly asserted
defense varies considerably, the majority of courts require that the PRP
have absolutely no connection to the actual polluter, and in recent years
the defense has undergone significant revision.141 In 2002, The Small
Business Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (“Brownsfields Law”)
substantially altered the standards and applicability of § 107(b)(3).142 As
the act’s full name implies, Brownfields Law was designed to “provide
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., United States v. M/V Santa Clara I, 887 F. Supp. 825, 843 (D.S.C. 1995) (finding
that a greater than predicted storm at sea was not an act of God); United States v.
Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
137 CERCLA § 107(b)(2).
138 For those who are interested, the principle case regarding an “act of war” defense is
Cedar & Washington Assocs., LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 751 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.
2014). The owners of the World Trade Center successfully employed the defense against
clean-up costs associated with the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
139 5–31 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 31.02, supra note 132 (quoting United
States v. Shell Oil Co., aff’d, 281 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2002)).
140 CERCLA § 107(b)(3).
141 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
118, 115 Stat. 2356, 2357 (2002).
142 Id.
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certain relief for small businesses from liability under [CERCLA].”143
While technically derivative of § 107(b)(3), practitioners distinguish three
variants of the Brownfields Law defense: (1) “innocent landowner defense”;
(2) bona-fide purchaser defense; (3) contiguous landowner defense.144
Each of these defenses are further limited by the blanket limitations of
non-foreseeability and unpreventability.145 The most common assertion
of this specific defense relates to improper handling of hazardous materi-
als by an employee or party contracted for waste removal.146 The majority
treatment of the defense by courts suggests that this commonly occurring
source of contamination would be precluded as the parties have contrac-
tual privity.147 The viability of an “innocent landowner” defense generally
tolls upon whether the PRP met the EPA’s established requirements for
due care under the “All Appropriate Inquiry” test.148 While these ele-
ments can potentially be prospectively met, the inquiry thoroughness is
extremely cumbersome—requiring extensive amounts of diligent review
of the property, previous owners, and the hiring of a “qualified environ-
mental professional.”149
Overall, the defenses themselves are significantly limited and pro-
vide PRPs with little ammunition to mount a genuine defense against
CERCLA liability.150 The act of god defense is rarely helpful to a PRP due
to the inexhaustible list of precautions that could be taken to prevent
contamination as a result of extreme weather.151 The act of war defense
has rarely been relevant and hopefully continues to be irrelevant.152 The
innocent landowner defense is often relevant; however, court imposed
143 Id. at preamble.
144 CERCLA § 107(b)(3).
145 Id. § 107(b)(1)–(3). As mentioned previously, all defenses are subject to the limitation
of being not foreseeable or preventable.
146 5–31 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 31.02, supra note 132.
147 Id.
148 See 40 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2015).
149 Id.
150 See, e.g., Town of Munster v. Sherwin Williams Co., 27 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling
that laches could not bar a town’s private action to recover cleanup costs under CERCLA,
and finding that defenses to CERCLA liability are only those enumerated in section 107(b),
which does not include any equitable defenses).
151 See 5–31 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 31.02(1)(b) (citing United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 892 F. Supp 648, 658 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1434 (3d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2479 (1997)) (“Even a release caused by a hurricane was
not excused under the act of God defense because the hurricane was not the sole cause
of the release and the effects of the hurricane could have been avoided by the exercise of
due care or foresight.”).
152 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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limitations have severely lessened the strength and applicability of this
defense.153 Furthermore, a pre-CERCLA insured cannot meet the re-
quirements of this defense because such requirements didn’t exist and
the insureds had no way of retrospectively meeting these requirements.
Beyond these defenses, a PRP cannot take any remedial action.154
Even if the PRP chooses to not comply with the demands of the PRP letter,
the EPA may effectuate clean-up and bring a collection suit within a federal
district court.155 Through the proceeding the EPA can virtually circumvent
the PRP, which will be unable to defend itself until a formal court collec-
tion proceeding occurs—where defenses will be even more limited.156
Unlike a traditional suit, the manner liability attaches within an
administrative proceeding to a pre-CERCLA insured virtually guaran-
tees success—ultimately, the EPA is not concerned with “who” floats the
bill but merely that the bill be paid.157 The invitation to engage in negoti-
ations is predicated upon the PRP admitting fault for the pollution, which
carries the practical effect of waiving all defenses that a PRP is theoreti-
cally capable of asserting under § 107(b).158 The negotiating power of the
PRP is further limited by the fact that the negotiations themselves are sub-
ject to ultimate approval by the EPA, who at any time can cease negotia-
tions and pursue its other options to attach liability.159 Again, the PRP
cannot contest EPA rejections of their feasibility plan.160 If the PRP chooses
to not comply with the letter, the PRP faces treble penalties under § 106.161
These damages accrue until the resolution of the CERCLA litigation.162
The fear of accruing treble damages serves as the admittedly coercive
backbone to PRP letters. Non-compliance carries significant penalties,
which ultimately (regardless of the jurisdiction) may fall outside the scope
of CGL coverage.163 The processes by which the EPA acquires clean-up
153 Id.
154 See generally CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012).
155 3–4A TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 CERCLA § 107(b)(1)–(3).
159 Mark S. Dennison, Annotation, What Constitutes “Suit” Triggering Insurer’s Duty to
Defend Environmental Claims—State Cases, 48 A.L.R.5th, 355 (1997).
160 Id.
161 CERCLA § 106; see also 3–4A TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02.
162 CERCLA § 106.
163 See generally Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 4th 204
(2d Dist. 1997). As a practical matter, treble damages often will exceed available funds
under many CGL policies.
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costs from PRPs is tailored very favorably for the EPA—the process al-
most guarantees that clean-up costs will be recovered.
Ultimately, the large discretionary statute of limitations, the
structure and practical limitations of the defenses under § 107(b), and
the general coerciveness of the PRP process reflects CERCLA’s primary
concern of finding a party to pay for the contamination. The aim and
efficiency with which CERCLA accomplishes its aim is undoubtedly com-
mendable; however, the ultimate result comes at the cost of providing
PRPs with significant recourse. The hybrid approach would suggest that
the one-sided nature/structure of CERCLA is coercive but this point
alone does not provide a satisfactory justification to the larger question
as to whether the system functions as a “suit.” CERCLA’s purpose inevita-
bly lent itself to imposing hardships upon polluters.164 The obvious cost
of instituting a polluter-pay system is that polluters are going to have to
pay.165 While speculating upon legislative intent is rarely productive, the
structure of CERCLA exhibits an almost inherent comment upon Con-
gress’s intent—that Congress found that the value of creating a hyper-
efficient clean-up procedure outweighed the hardships that numerous
individuals would inevitably experience under a liability structure as
broad as CERCLA’s. The fact that the structure is coercive does not
support the conclusion that the structure is a “suit” under pre-CERCLA
CGLs. Arguably all regulatory penalties are coercive, the penalties are
meant to inspire compliance. Furthermore, it is unclear why shifting
liability away from polluters is a more equitable resolution. If there is an
issue with innocent parties being fined under CERCLA, then the solution
to such a problem clearly rests in redefining PRPs under CERCLA.
B. Majority Analysis Under Legal Functionalism
One major obstacle to analyzing the Majority’s approach to pre-
CERCLA CGL policies from a Functionalist perspective is that Function-
alist approaches vary significantly depending on which jurisdiction (or even
which court) is interpreting the agreement.166 As such, prior to generally
applying the “reasonable expectations” test, this section will consider
whether the Majority’s analysis of pre-CERCLA CGL policies serves the
same underlying policy concerns of Legal Functionalism. Generally,
courts apply the broader interpretive Functionalist strategies to correct
two equitable issues that may arise from a traditional interpretation.
164 See generally CERCLA, H.R. 510, 96th Cong. (1980).
165 Id. CERCLA self-describes itself as a “polluter pay system.”
166 Swisher, supra note 6, at 544.
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First, Legal Functionalism seeks to correct stark imbalances of
bargaining power that manifest themselves as a result of the application
of narrower Formalist analysis to “adhesion”167 contracts.168 As men-
tioned in the introduction, the standardized nature of insurance contracts
lends the agreements to significant Functionalist criticism.169 Courts often
construe the standardization of insurance contract terms as a per se
indication that an insured consumer lacks the ability to engage in sub-
stantial bargaining.170 While this criticism may ultimately be misplaced,171
the courts’ perspective recognizes the commercial reality that the average
consumer insurance contract will likely not materially depart from the
draft initially presented to the consumer.172 As such, insurers are seen as
offering policies on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.
Legal Functionalism also attempts to correct the discrepancy
between the insureds’ and insurers’ levels of sophistication. While the
concern is most prevalent when the insured is an average consumer of
limited education, courts tend to presume that sophistication is an ever-
present concern.173 In most cases, the presumption is likely justified as
any insured would likely be less sophisticated than an insurer in regards
to insurance policies.174 While Legal Functionalism’s concerns may be
legitimate in relation to an average consumer insurance contract, the
underlying policy concerns are irrelevant to pre-CERCLA CGL policies.
In light of the circumstances leading to inequity, the Majority’s
appeal to Legal Functionalism is somewhat ironic. The Majority employs
167 “A standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a
weaker position, [often] a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the
terms.” Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “adhesion contract”).
168 Swisher, supra note 6, at 549 (explaining the perspective that insurance contracts are
often adhesion contracts because the insurer has superior bargaining power). But see
Fischer, supra note 11, at 1012 (challenging the notion that the standardized nature of
insurance contracts renders them per se adhesive).
169 Fischer, supra note 11, at 997.
170 Id. at 1014 (“Courts often ignore or down-play evidence indicating that the insured
was capable of bargaining for coverage but failed to do so.”).
171 Id. at 1013 (recognizing that courts often treat insurance policies as adhesion con-
tracts, yet ultimately concluding that the insured’s lack of bargaining power is a product
of a lack of sophistication, rather than a true inability of the insured to bargain for the
coverage that they desire).
172 Id. at 1047–48.
173 See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1253 (noting that while some courts do enforce adhesion contracts
against parties on the basis of commercial sophistication, such a finding does not eliminate
the possibility of unenforceability).
174 Fischer, supra note 11, at 1047–48.
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Legal Functionalism, a doctrine which attempts to correct prominent dis-
crepancies within bargaining power and sophistication, to pre-CERCLA
CGL insurance contracts because the EPA’s ability to attach liability under
CERCLA essentially leaves the unsophisticated PRP (a consequence of
retroactive liability) with no bargaining power (ability to negotiate or
defend liability). In a sense, the Majority’s application of Functionalism
does serve the underlying policy concerns; however, the culprit of the
unequitable consequences is CERCLA itself—rather than the insurer.
Within the context of CGL polices, the underlying concern of
sophistication is likely overstated. The parties contracting under CGL
policies likely are not average everyday consumers. While courts have
employed Functionalist doctrine to commercial parties, such an applica-
tion does a major disservice to both the commercial entities and the
market at large.175 When a court promises commercial entities the con-
tract the entity “expected” regardless of the contract’s form, the court pro-
vides a disincentive for the entity to exert efforts to analyze the agreement
or consider their particular coverage needs in relation to the policy being
offered.176 This incentive frustrates the insurer’s commercial reliance upon
standardization, which serves as an economic necessity for facilitating
efficient modern insurance transactions.177 Absent standardization, the
costs associated with contracting for insurance would either rise to the
point where the average consumer could no longer afford insurance or
would cease to be economically viable all together.178
The disincentive for commercial entities to at least attempt to
understand the policy further frustrates the second concern of Legal
Functionalism. Absent placing an extremely cumbersome duty upon in-
surers to inform,179 how can a court expect an insured to exert any bar-
gaining power over a contract that the insured is utterly incapable of
175 See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
176 The assumption here is that absent broader rules of construction, commercial entities
seeking insurance will need to adjust how they engage with insurers in order to ensure
proper coverage. While insurers may stand in a position to better absorb costs, placing
the burden upon insurers to anticipate and incorporate the particular concerns of a
commercial entity is somewhat strange.
177 Swisher, supra note 6, at 572 (“[S]tandardized insurance contracts are indispensable
instruments in conducting an insurance business in a mass society”); Fischer, supra note
11, at 1020 (“[B]enefits of standardization to the insured . . . include providing appro-
priate packages of coverage to individuals who usually are unable to define or describe
the scope of coverage needed”).
178 See generally Fischer, supra note 11.
179 For further information regarding proposed duty to inform, see id. at 1056 (discussing
the rejection of a duty to advise/inform insureds on the scope of their policies).
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understanding or unconcerned with? Furthermore, within the context of
pre-CERCLA CGL policies the secondary concern of sophistication is
inherently irrelevant—even if the insured were more sophisticated in the
art of insurance, there is no realistic possibility that the insured could
have negotiated a policy that indemnified itself from CERCLA’s unprece-
dented and radical retroactive liability.
1. Analysis of (un)Reasonable Expectations
“Reasonable expectation” tests vary significantly depending on
the court applying it; however, the overarching concern is effectuating
the “reasonable expectations of the insurance applicants . . . regarding
the terms of the insurance contract.”180 As such, the overarching driving
question is whether a PRP under a pre-CERCLA CGL policy could have
reasonably expected his/her policy to cover CERCLA clean-up costs.
The main logical problem for the Majority’s position is that it is
difficult to imagine a world in which the parties reasonably expected the
sort of broad liability structure and damages that would arise under
CERCLA. While pre-CERCLA CGL policies did cover certain types of
property damage, the policies themselves were not created for the pur-
poses of indemnifying clean-up costs associated with CERCLA.181 CGL’s
primary purpose has been to protect a business in the event its lessee’s
commercial activities harm the leased premises.182 Furthermore, almost
immediately after CERCLA’s passage ISO redrafted the standard-form
CGL to explicitly exclude CERCLA damage.183
Even supposing that the insured exerted extraordinary foresight
(or exhibited commercially unreasonable stupidity) the simple fact re-
mains that the payments made under the policy were not calculated for
the indemnification of CERCLA damages; rather, the premiums reflected
the coverage contemplated in a world prior to the advent of CERCLA.184
When CERCLA’s radical regulatory scheme disrupted the commercial mar-
ket, courts were faced with a difficult decision. Either lessen the blow by
justifying an unrealistic expectation—no matter how unlikely, misguided,
or non-mutual—or allow the parties to whom the regulation specifically
180 Id. at 551.
181 See generally Swisher, supra note 6, at 600.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 184–85.
184 See generally Fischer, supra note 11, at 1062 (discussing the accurate relation between
premium cost and coverage provided).
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sought to attach liability to, absorb the costs associated with his/her actions.
The Majority’s choice to do the former, represents an arbitrary displace-
ment of the costs that Congress intended the insured to bear.
CONCLUSION
While intentions driving the Majority’s liability-shifting approach
to Pre-CERCLA CGL policies may arise from well-intentioned moral
sympathy for polluters who were adversely affected by CERCLA, ulti-
mately the Majority’s transposing of equity is ill-placed. Legal Function-
alism should serve as the exception to the general rules of contracting.
An exception that courts utilize to correct genuine cases of abuse that vio-
late genuine equitable considerations. If the manner liability attaches to
PRPs is inequitable, then the courts should have targeted the true source
of that inequity—the legislation itself. In fact, the opportunity availed itself
on numerous occasions.185 Courts must accept the fact that certain equity
will inevitably be lost in the advent of a regulatory scheme that carries
retroactive effects. If this loss of equity is concerning then perhaps there
needs to be a reevaluation of CERCLA’s liability scheme by Congress.
The authority to fix equitable issues within CERCLA lies with
Congress, not the courts. Within the context of transactional disputes,
the courts’ primary concern should be serving as a neutral interpretive
body. The decision of the Majority to interpret these CGL contracts under
the equitable doctrines does not carry a genuinely equitable result; rather,
the decision is merely an arbitrary shifting of liability.
While a Functionalist approach may provide some relief when ap-
plied to undeniably186 unconscionable contracts, any broad application is
counterintuitive to the general purposes of facilitating an efficient mar-
ket. While consumer protection is a genuine policy concern, this concern
is best left to those designated by society to deal with those areas (i.e.,
Congress, FTC).
In conclusion, the application of “reasonable expectations” doc-
trine to pre-CERCLA CGL insurance policies merely shifts liability under
an unexpected regulatory scheme, and fails to serve the policy concerns
upon which the Legal Functionalism serves.
185 See generally Alfred Light & David McGee, Preenforcement, Preimplementation, and
Postcompletion Preclusion of Judicial Review Under CERCLA, 22 ELR 10397; David
Jones & Kyle McSlarrow, . . . But Were Afraid to Ask: Superfund Case Law, 1981–1989,
19 ELR 10430.
186 One of the primary issues with the Functionalist approach is determining what is
truly unconscionable.
